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ABSTRACT
This article considers the origin, meaning and current relevance of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) Article 3.8 presumption that a
government measure which infringes World Trade Organization (WTO) obli-
gations constitutes a prima facie case of nullification or impairment. It is
argued that the prevailing interpretation of this provision is inconsistent
with its plain language and may have contributed to the tendency of respon-
dent states to invoke the presumption in order to undermine the fundamen-
tal principle that General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/WTO rules protect
competitive opportunities rather than trade flows. The key to understanding
the provision resides in the acknowledgment that the concept of nullification
or impairment can be understood in two different senses depending on the
stage in the proceedings at which it is relevant. While there is an isolated
indication that the Appellate Body is edging closer to a re-interpretation of
the provision, it is suggested that the dispute settlement process could be
modestly simplified with some amendments to the DSU.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article considers a provision which has caused a great deal of confusion
in the dispute settlement process. Article 3.8 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) provides as follows:
In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a
covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case
of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a pre-
sumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other
Members parties to that covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall
be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been brought to
rebut the charge.
 Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Swansea University. E-mail: a.p.davies@swan.ac.uk. The
author is grateful for comments provided by the anonymous reviewers.
Journal of International Economic Law 13(1), 181–204
doi:10.1093/jiel/jgp043.
Journal of International Economic Law Vol. 13 No. 1  Oxford University Press 2010, all rights reserved
 at U
niversity of W
ales, Sw
ansea on June 14, 2012
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The Appellate Body has stated that Article 3.8, ‘establishes a legal presump-
tion that a breach of WTO rules constitutes nullification or impairment, . . .
in clear and unambiguous terms’.1 Contrary to this view, it is argued here
that there is little which is clear about the operation of the presumption.
While it has been considered in numerous cases, some of which having
landmark status, the questions raised by the presumption have not been
clearly articulated and resolved. Some of the Appellate Body’s statements
about the presumption convey a sense of ambivalence as can be detected by
comparing the passages below.
In the original EC – Bananas III dispute, the panel and the Appellate
Body relied on the conclusions of the GATT panel in US – Superfund
to find that proving the absence of actual trade effects is insufficient to
rebut the presumption of nullification or impairment under Article 3.8 of
the DSU.2
The text of Article 3.8 of the DSU suggests that a Member may rebut the
presumption of nullification or impairment by demonstrating that its
breach of WTO rules has no adverse impact on other Members. Trade
losses represent an obvious example of adverse impact under Article 3.8.3
The source of this ambivalence is uncertainty about two related matters;
these being the stage in the proceedings during which, and the purpose for
which, the presumption and the possibility of rebuttal operate. In turn, these
uncertainties revolve around the concept of nullification or impairment
(hereafter NOI), and the tendency to lose sight of the different senses in
which this concept can be understood.
The term NOI is first used entirely interchangeably with the term
‘infringement’. This interchangeability can be explained with reference to
language such as NOI of the benefits accruing to World Trade
Organization (WTO) Members directly or indirectly under the covered
agreements.4 The exact nature of these benefits depends on the provision
in question. In respect of core General Agreement on Tariff and Trade
(GATT) obligations such as the prohibition on quantitative restrictions
(Article XI), national and most favored nation treatment (Articles III and
1 WTO Appellate Body Reports, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador (EC – Bananas
III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II)) (adopted 11 December 2008) WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, and
Corr.1/European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas –
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States (EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US))
(adopted 22 December 2008) WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA and Corr.1, n 400.
2 Ibid para 458.
3 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar (EC – Export
Subsidies on Sugar) (adopted 19May 2005) WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/
AB/R, para 289.
4 This is representative of the language used in various provisions such as GATT Article XXIII.1
and DSU Articles 3.5, 22.8, 23.1 and 26:1.
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I), they have been defined in the case law as the expectation of equal com-
petitive conditions and opportunities between the goods of different origins
which are being compared. The relevant cases are so replete with statements
to this effect5 that it has been possible for the Appellate Body to approve the
generalization that, ‘WTO rules are not concerned with actual trade effects,
but rather with competitive opportunities’.6 This statement applies more
directly to the provisions above than it does, for example, to procedural
obligations in the trade remedies context. At issue in Guatemala – Cement
(I) was the obligation in Article 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement for
authorities to notify the exporting Member of a possible dumping investiga-
tion. The panel noted that the function of this requirement is to, ‘ensure that
interested parties . . . are able to take whatever steps they deem appropriate
to defend their interests’; a statement which identifies the specific benefit
protected by the provision.7 If there is a difference between these contexts,8
then there is also an overarching way of thinking about the benefit which is
impaired by an infringement of any obligation. Complaining states in a
number of cases have identified this benefit. An example from the WTO
cases is Thailand’s contention that ‘the ‘‘most fundamental benefit’’ accruing
to a WTO Member under the provisions of the covered agreements is ‘‘the
benefit of their observance in good faith by the other Members’’ ’.9
For present purposes, it matters little whether the precise benefit which is
nullified or impaired varies as between different provisions, or whether an
overarching view can be adopted. This is because the examples above have
something in common. Once it is known that a provision has been infringed,
it is also known that the benefit protected by this provision has been nullified
5 A compilation of these GATTand WTO cases is provided in WTO Panel Report, United States
– Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (adopted 27 July 2000) WT/DS160/R, n 163.
6 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II), EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), above n 1,
para 466.
7 WTO Panel Report, Guatemala – Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from
Mexico (adopted 25November 1998), WT/DS60/R, para 7.42.
8 The existence of a difference between the benefits protected by core GATT obligations, and
procedural obligations, is not something which has to be conceded. In Guatemala – Cement I,
the reference to interested parties defending their interests can be seen as an aspect of pre-
serving competitive opportunities so that the Appellate Body’s statement about the nature of
WTO rules need not be seen as an over-generalization.
9 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, above n 3, para 83. In the
GATT cases, the complainants in US – Superfund argued that ‘one of the benefits accruing to
them under the General Agreement certainly was the observance by other contracting parties
of the fundamental GATT principle of national treatment’. GATT Panel Report, United States
– Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (US – Superfund) (adopted 17 June 1987)
L/6175, BISD34S/136, para 3.1.8. Similarly, Japan argued in EC - Audio Cassettes ‘the ‘‘ben-
efit’’ nullified was Japan’s right that Parties to the Agreement observe the Agreement’s require-
ments before levying anti-dumping duties against exporters.’ GATT Panel Report, EC –
Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan (28April 1995) ADP/
136, unadopted, para 55.
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or impaired. In reality, if not always in appearance, the process of deciding
whether there is NOI is an integral part of the analysis of whether there is an
infringement. In other words, the benefits intended to be protected by the
GATT/WTO legal system are primarily embodied in the provisions of the
covered agreements.
For shorthand, this meaning of NOI will be referred to as ‘the infringe-
ment sense’. As is already evident, this meaning applies when the term NOI
is used during, or immediately after, the stage in the proceedings when the
existence of an infringement is discussed. The prevailing view in the case law
is that Article 3.8 bears this meaning and operates in this context.
NOI is also understood in the different sense of adverse impact on trade
flows later in the proceedings when the availability and scope of the remedy
(usually the suspension of concessions) becomes relevant should the respon-
dent state fail to promptly withdraw the offending measures. In practice, the
clearest evidence of such an adverse impact is a reduction in trade volumes
resulting from the successfully challenged measures. However, there could
also be an adverse impact on trade flows where trade volumes increase,
provided it can be established that trade volumes are not as high as they
would otherwise have been.
The two meanings need to be distinguished because there can be an
infringement (and therefore NOI in the infringement sense) whether or
not there is an accompanying adverse impact on trade flows. The very
matter which is pivotal in suspension proceedings is formally irrelevant in
infringement proceedings, even though the Treaty text refers to NOI in both
areas.
If the reference to NOI in Article 3.8 is understood in the infringement
sense, it must then be accepted that the provision can only operate as an
irrebuttable presumption that an infringement constitutes a case of NOI. It is
perhaps not a stretch of the imagination to say that most panels have under-
stood, and that the Appellate Body understands, Article 3.8 in this way.
However, the fact that it is formulated as a rebuttable presumption leads
to the expression of more guarded views which keep alive the theoretical
possibility of rebuttal. This leads respondent states to attempt rebuttal, per-
haps because they genuinely misunderstand this to be possible, or perhaps
because they hope that a panel will make a mistake in their favor, even
though they fully understand the irrebuttable nature of the presumption.
Such a mistake is rather unlikely to occur, but not inconceivable. While it
is generally considered that the presumption has never been rebutted, the
panel in EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar erroneously thought otherwise.10
10 WTO Panel Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, above n 3, n 675 to para 7.370. In this
note, the panel states that the Article 3.8 presumption, ‘. . .has never been rebutted except in
the exceptional panel report on US – Section 301 Trade Act.’ However, Article 3.8 was not
mentioned in US – Section 301 Trade Act, and rightly so, for it can only apply ‘[i]n cases where
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These observations provide a basis for asking whether Article 3.8 can be
interpreted to enable its operation as a genuinely rebuttable presumption.
This could be achieved by abandoning the prevailing interpretation of
Article 3.8 as a presumption of NOI in the infringement sense which oper-
ates during or immediately after the infringement analysis. Instead, it could
be interpreted as a presumption that an infringement constitutes a prima facie
case of NOI in the sense of adverse impact on trade flows, and as operating
at the commencement of suspension proceedings. Here, there is a meaning-
ful distinction between the issue of infringement, and that of whether the
infringement causes NOI in the sense of adverse impact on trade flows.
These will normally occur together, although an infringement which causes
no adverse impact in terms of trade flows is also possible.
A powerful and simple argument can be made in favor of this approach by
asking why a respondent state would wish to rebut the Article 3.8 presump-
tion. The wording makes it possible to dispense with one possibility. Article
3.8 can only apply, ‘[i]n cases where there is an infringement’, so that the
issue of infringement is finalized before any presumption can apply. It follows
that attempts at rebuttal have nothing to do with negating the infringement.
The only other plausible explanation is that rebuttal is connected with the
availability and scope of the remedy should the respondent state fail to
promptly withdraw the infringing measures. Much would seem to follow
from this realization. Article 3.8 should be understood as operating when
the remedy is being decided upon, and NOI should be given the meaning
which is usually attributed to it at this stage of the proceedings.
The further sections of this article explore and test the ideas introduced
above, beginning with an identification of the case law origin of the presump-
tion in Section II. It is argued that an irrebuttable presumption ought to have
been established from the outset, so that the first enactment of the presump-
tion in 1979 represented a failure to correct the mistake of a 1962 panel. An
irrebuttable presumption would have reinforced the original rationale, and
prevented respondent states from viewing the presumption as a means of
undermining the principle that GATT/WTO rules are concerned with com-
petitive opportunities rather than actual trade effects. Section III briefly
traces the development of this case law principle from the very early years
of GATT, up to its concretization in US – Superfund.11 This was the first
occasion on which a panel was required to rule on the relationship between
the 1979 presumption and the emphasis on protecting competitive opportu-
nities. It is argued that some of the panel’s reasoning was unconvincing by
there is an infringement. . .’. In this case, the panel concluded that there was no infringement,
so that the essential requirement which triggers the operation of Article 3.8 was not present.
11 US-Superfund, above n 9.
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reason of being at odds with the plain language of the presumption. An
alternative analysis is suggested which would have laid to rest the premature
reliance on the presumption by respondent states. Attention then turns in
Section IV to a search for the elements of the suggested approach towards
the presumption in the modern case law. These elements are, first, that NOI
can be understood in two different senses; secondly, that an infringement
constitutes a case of NOI and thirdly, that Article 3.8 operates at the com-
mencement of suspension proceedings. Strong support for all but the third
element is found. It is argued that the adoption of the third element would
be more consistent with the plain language of the provision than the present
approach. The closing recommendations in Section V question whether fur-
ther developments should be left to the Appellate Body, or whether amend-
ments to the DSU should be contemplated. The preference is for the latter
option, and suggested revisions to the text are set out.
II. TRACING THE ORIGIN OF THE PRESUMPTION
The text of Article 3.8 is derived from the DSU’s predecessor, the 1979
Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement
and Surveillance (the 1979 Understanding).12 The relevant provision is con-
tained in paragraph 5 of the Annex to this instrument which is entitled
Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field
of Dispute Settlement (paragraph 5). Surprisingly, the case law origin of this
provision does not seem to have been identified in any of the cases in which
paragraph 5 or Article 3.8 have been discussed. Indeed the wording of the
provision has even been incorrectly attributed to the US – Superfund case.13
The correct attribution is the 1962 case of Uruguayan Recourse to Article
XXIII.14 The panel’s views were as follows:
14. In most cases Uruguay claimed that the maintenance of the trade
measures by the other contracting parties had nullified or impaired ben-
efits accruing to Uruguay under the General Agreement. The Panel
thought it essential to have a clear idea as to what would constitute a
nullification or impairment. In its view impairment and nullification in
the sense of [GATT] Article XXIII does not arise merely because of the
existence of any measures; the nullification or impairment must relate to
benefits accruing to the contracting party ‘under the General Agreement’.
15. In implementing the compensation provision of Article XXIII:2 [deal-
ing with suspension of concessions] the CONTRACTING PARTIES
12 (Adopted on 28 November 1979), L/4907.
13 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article
22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB, circulated 9 April 1999, para 6.11.
14 GATT Panel Report, Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII (adopted 16November 1962)
L/1923, BISD11S/95.
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would therefore need to know what benefits accruing under the
Agreement, in the view of the country invoking the provisions, had been
nullified or impaired, and the reasons for this view. In cases where there is
a clear infringement of the provisions of the General Agreement . . . the
action would, prima facie, constitute a case of nullification or impairment
and would ipso facto require consideration of whether the circumstances
are serious enough to justify the authorization of suspension of conces-
sions or obligations. . .
These passages establish the original rationale for the presumption which is
to simplify the process by which complaining states can permissibly call for
the establishment of a panel. This is not immediately apparent because of
the importance the panel attributes to Uruguay spelling out exactly what
benefits have been nullified or impaired. This identification is described as
‘essential’ in paragraph 14. The key point however is that this obligation
evaporates in instances where there is a ‘clear infringement’ under paragraph
15. Thus the request for establishment can be framed in terms of allegations
of how identified measures infringe certain provisions. There is no further
need to explain what benefits have been nullified or impaired, and how.
This original rationale has been confirmed in the WTO case law. Among
the issues before the panel in Mexico – Corn Syrup15 was the alleged insuf-
ficiency of the United States’ request for a panel. The governing provision
was Article 17.5(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement which requires the
requesting Member to indicate, ‘. . .how a benefit accruing to it, directly or
indirectly, under this Agreement, has been nullified or impaired. . .’. Mexico
argued that these requirements could not be satisfied ‘implicitly’ and drew
attention to the absence of the terms ‘nullify’ or ‘impair’ in the request for a
panel. Citing DSU Article 3.8, the panel disagreed and considered that ‘. . .a
request for establishment that alleges violations of the AD Agreement . . .
contains a sufficient allegation of NOI. . .’.16
There is a clear sense in both cases that the concept of NOI is of limited
relevance at least in cases where infringements are alleged, as opposed to
non-violation complaints. Yet the 1962 panel erred on the side of caution
and established a presumption rather than an absolute rule. The panel there-
fore preserved the possibility of separate and additional discussion under the
heading of NOI even when infringements have been confirmed. The prefer-
ence for a presumption is highly questionable if it is accepted (as argued in
the introduction and as developed further in Section IV.B.) that, if there is an
infringement of a provision, there is necessarily also a NOI of the benefit
which is protected by the provision. The only way to attempt to make sense
of paragraph 15 is to claim that the panel was referring to NOI in the sense
15 WTO Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS)
from the United States (adopted 24February 2000), WT/DS132/R.
16 Ibid para 7.28.
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of adverse impact on trade flows; the sense which is relevant at the stage in
the proceedings when the level of suspension of concessions is decided.
However, this does not seem to be the panel’s intention. While the panel
makes references to suspension, there are also references to NOI of ‘benefits
accruing to the contracting party. . .’ which is indicative of the infringement
sense. This would seem to be what the panel intended bearing in mind that
the case was about how complaining states can permissibly formulate their
claims at the commencement of proceedings, and that a decision on suspen-
sion was explicitly deferred.17 Without the removal of the term ‘prima facie’,
paragraph 15 does not make sense, so that the panel should have established
an absolute rule. This would have reinforced the original rationale by fully
aligning the issue of infringement with the concept of NOI.
Bearing these points in mind, it is regrettable that the panel’s formulation
was elevated to the status of Treaty language by the 1979 text. This resulted
in attempts by respondent states to rebut the presumption in cases bearing
no relation to those above which illustrate the original rationale. Had the
mistake of the 1962 panel been corrected in the 1979 text, this would have
been avoided and the overall process of dispute settlement would have been
modestly simplified. As it stands, the enactment of the presumption is seen
by respondent states as a means of undermining the principle that GATT/
WTO rules are not concerned with actual trade effects, but rather with
competitive opportunities.
III. THE 1979 PRESUMPTION AND ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE A
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE
This section first describes the origin and development of the emphasis on
protecting competitive opportunities. It then addresses the tendency of
respondent states to invoke the presumption in order to undermine this
principle. This tendency is considered to be understandable and defensible
based on the text of the presumption. The adequacy of the judicial response
to this use of the presumption is then assessed with particular reference to
the US – Superfund case.
A. The protection of competitive opportunities and the consequent
rejection of evidence relating to trade flows
It is firmly established that the core GATT obligations can be infringed
whether or not the challenged measures have had an impact on trade
flows, or have resulted in trade damage or produced an adverse impact or
trade effects.18 The first pronouncements to this effect made by half the
17 Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, above n 14, para 20.
18 These phrases have been used interchangeably in the case law.
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members of the Working Party on Brazil – Internal Taxes19 in 1949, signifi-
cantly pre-date the 1987 US – Superfund20 case which is usually cited as the
landmark precedent in this area. At issue in Brazil – Internal Taxes was a law
maintaining a tax differential of 100 per cent between certain domestic prod-
ucts and exactly the same imported products. The report did not provide a
legal ruling in that it went no further than setting out the positions of both
sides and that of the other delegates. One of the defenses presented by the
Brazilian delegate, with which two other delegates agreed, was that ‘unless
damage to other contracting parties could be demonstrated, a breach of
Article III could not be alleged’. The other three members disagreed, con-
sidering that ‘[W]hether or not damage was shown, taxes on imported prod-
ucts in excess of those on like domestic products were prohibited by Article
III, and that the provisions of Article III were intended to prevent damage
and not merely to provide a means of rectifying such damage.’21 They went
on to state that:
the absence of imports from contracting parties during any period of time
that might be selected for examination would not necessarily be an indi-
cation that they had no interest in exports of the product affected by the
tax, since their potentialities as exporters, given national treatment, should
be taken into account. . . [T]he provisions of the first sentence of Article
III, paragraph 2, were equally applicable whether imports from other con-
tracting parties were substantial, small or non-existent.22
The first of a number of cases from the 1980s cast doubt on whether these
pronouncements would gain a foothold and become part of the GATT
acquis. At issue in the unadopted report in Spain – Soyabean Oil23 were
Spanish consumption quotas specifying limits on the domestic consumption
of soyabean oil. The panel considered that there could not be a violation of
Article III:1 unless the challenged measures had an ‘adverse effect’ in the
sense of restricting or limiting imports of soyabeans from the United States.
As the statistics indicated a ‘considerable increase of soyabean imports
. . .which did not show any signs of weakening’, there was no violation.24
There was strong opposition to this ruling. Hudec described a request by
the United States to the GATT Council that the report be merely noted
instead of adopted. Indeed, as Hudec noted, ‘the United States even offered
to drop its complaint in exchange for wiping this ruling off the books’. At a
19 Working Party Report, Brazilian Internal Taxes (adopted 30 June 1949), GATT/CP.3/42 (First
Report), BISD II/181.
20 Above n 9.
21 Ibid para 15.
22 Ibid para 16.
23 GATT Panel Report, Spain – Measures Concerning Domestic Sale of Soyabean Oil – Recourse to
Article XXIII:2 by the United States (circulated 17 June 1981), L/5142, unadopted.
24 Ibid paras 4.1–4.3.
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November 1981 meeting, 24 delegations spoke, of which 21 supported the
US proposal.25
The next case in which the role of trade flows arose was Canada – FIRA.26
This came three years after Spain – Soyobean Oil, but sided with the views of
the complainants in Brazil – Internal Taxes. In Canada – FIRA, the United
States challenged the Canadian practice of entering into agreements with
foreign investors involving preferences for the purchase of Canadian goods
over imported goods. The panel found these commitments to be inconsistent
with Article III:4 both in cases where the commitment was absolute, and in
cases where the commitment was qualified, for example, by the condition
that Canadian goods be ‘competitively available’.27 The panel considered
that this qualification would require a preference for Canadian goods
where the competing imported and domestic goods were available on equiv-
alent terms. The United States had made a persuasive argument here which,
while not expressly approved be panel, could be described as an elaboration
of its reasoning. According to the United States, ‘. . .a firm subject to an
undertaking with such a proviso was therefore likely to purchase Canadian
goods even when they were less attractive than imported goods in order to
avoid possible conflict with Canadian officials monitoring compliance who
have a different perspective and apply different value judgements on these
matters.’28 The panel expressed an implicit approval of this argument in
noting that the purchase requirements, ‘tend to tip the balance in favour
of Canadian products, thus coming into conflict with Article III:4.’29
The panel’s rejection of trade flows was hinted at in its conclusions. It was
recognized that the purchase requirements may have reflected plans which
the investors would have carried out in the absence of undertakings.30 In
other words, the undertakings may not have had any actual impact on trade
flows, but they still amounted to a violation based on what some members of
the Working Party in Brazil – Internal Taxes described as the potentiality of
an impact. The manner in which the panel elaborated on its conclusion was,
however, unfortunate in the sense that it could be read as a step in the wrong
direction. For the panel, it followed that, ‘many of the undertakings, though
technically in violation with the General Agreement, therefore possibly do
not nullify or impair benefits accruing to the United States under the
25 Robert E Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law. The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal
System (Butterworth Legal Publishers, New Hampshire 1993) 136.
26 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act
(7February 1984), L/5504, BISD30S/140.
27 Ibid paras 5.8–5.9.
28 Ibid para 3.5.
29 Ibid para 6.3.
30 Ibid para 6.4. This statement recognizes the plausibility of a Canadian defence that under-
takings would only be given to the extent that ‘they reflected a decision by the investor about
how he intended to conduct his business in Canada’ (para 3.6).
190 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(1)
 at U
niversity of W
ales, Sw
ansea on June 14, 2012
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
General Agreement.’31 This statement is at odds with the position argued for
in this article—that once an infringement is confirmed, it necessarily follows
that the benefit protected by the infringed provision has been nullified or
impaired. As Roessler notes, ‘[I]n a multilateral trade order which prescribes
conditions of competition and therefore does not guarantee trade results but
trade opportunities, the application of the concept of nullification and
impairment to violation cases cannot fulfill a useful function’.32
The reason why the panel arguably fell into error in this part of its rea-
soning might have been a failure to sufficiently distinguish two different
enquiries. The first is whether there is an infringement/whether there is
NOI of a protected benefit, while the second enquiry relates to the availabil-
ity and extent of the remedy available in the event of recalcitrance in the
removal of the infringement. The consideration of trade flows is only indis-
pensably relevant under the second issue. As was noted by the panel in US –
Manufacturing Clause, ‘[C]onsideration of whether the circumstances of the
case were serious enough to justify authorization of a suspension of obliga-
tions or concessions could not be addressed before the basic issue of con-
formity had been resolved.’33
A final point about Canada – FIRA is that, by this time, the 1979 pre-
sumption had been enacted. This led the panel to believe that ‘an evaluation
of the trade effects was not directly relevant to its findings because a breach
of a GATT rule is presumed to have an adverse impact on other contracting
parties’.34 This reference to the presumption is regrettable. The original
rationale for the presumption was unconnected with the doctrine that
GATT rules are concerned with competitive opportunities rather than with
actual trade effects. This development was very nearly set in stone by this
time so that the presumption was not required in this context. More prob-
lematically, however, it was not long before respondent states set about
trying to rebut the presumption.
B. The attempt to rebut the presumption in US – Superfund
At issue in US – Superfund was a discriminatory tax with domestic petroleum
being subject to a rate of 8.3 cents per barrel and the imported product
being subject to 11.7 cents per barrel. This was challenged by Canada, the
EEC and Mexico as inconsistent with GATT Article III:2 first sentence. The
United States argued that this difference was too small to ‘appreciably
31 Ibid para 6.4.
32 Frieder Roessler, ‘The Concept of Nullification and Impairment in the Legal System of the
World Trade Organization’, in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed) International Trade Law and the
GATT/WTO Legal System, Studies in Transnational Economic Law, volume 11 (Kluwer Law
International, London 1997) 125–42 at 141.
33 GATT Panel Report, United States Manufacturing Clause (adopted 15May1984), L/5609,
BISD31S/74, para 30.
34 Canada – FIRA, above n 26, para 6.6.
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influence petroleum buyers’ decisions’ and ‘to stimulate investments in
domestic oil production’. The United States also considered that it would
import approximately the same volume of petroleum as before in spite of the
tax differential. The request was for a finding that benefits accruing to
the complainants under the GATT had not been nullified or impaired on
the basis of the absence of adverse trade effects.35
The panel dismissed this request in an entirely convincing passage which
would later gain landmark status noting that ‘. . .Article III:2, first sentence,
cannot be interpreted to protect expectations on export volumes; it protects
expectations on the competitive relationship between imported and domestic
products. A change in the competitive relationship contrary to that provision
must consequently be regarded ipso facto as a NOI of benefits accruing under
the General Agreement.’36 In other words, there is an irrebuttable presump-
tion that an infringement of the provision results in NOI of benefits pro-
tected under the GATT. However, the manner in which the panel attempted
to reconcile this position with the 1979 presumption was unconvincing by
reason of being at odds with the plain language of the presumption. Agreeing
with the complainants,37 the panel noted that, ‘the impact of a measure
inconsistent with the General Agreement is not relevant for a determination
of NOI’.38 Contrary to this conclusion, the presumption seems to envisage
an absence of ‘adverse impact’ leading to an absence of NOI. Paragraph 5 of
the 1979 Understanding39 is provided below. Within this provision, the
underlined passages now constitute DSU Article 3.8.40
5. In practice, contracting parties have had recourse to Article XXIII only
when in their view a benefit accruing to them under the General
Agreement was being nullified or impaired. In cases where there is an
infringement of the obligations assumed under the General Agreement,
the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of NOI. A prima
facie case of NOI would ipso facto require consideration of whether the
circumstances are serious enough to justify the authorization of suspension
of concessions or obligations, if the contracting party bringing the com-
plaint so requests. This means that there is normally a presumption that a
breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other contracting parties, and
in such cases, it is up to the contracting parties against whom the com-
plaint has been brought to rebut the charge . . . (emphasis added)
Whether one looks at the former or present text, ‘NOI’ is clearly and ines-
capably equated with ‘adverse impact’. In turn, the latter phrase seems to
35 US – Superfund, above n 9, para 3.1.3.
36 Ibid para 5.1.9.
37 Ibid para 3.1.6.
38 Ibid para 5.1.5.
39 Above n 12.
40 This is subject to a few immaterial differences such as the use of ‘contracting parties’ in the
1979 text while the present text refers to ‘the Member’.
192 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(1)
 at U
niversity of W
ales, Sw
ansea on June 14, 2012
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
convey the idea of something which is tangible, most obviously an actual
impact on trade flows rather than merely a potential impact. The ordinary
meaning therefore conveys the possibility of rebutting a presumption of NOI/
adverse impact, by demonstrating the absence of impact on trade flows
resulting from an infringing measure.
If this seems heretical on the basis that few cases have been cited with
approval more often than US – Superfund, the Appellate Body statement
provided in the introduction can be recalled. Tellingly, US – Superfund was
not cited by the Appellate Body when it observed that:
. . .Article 3.8 equates the concept of ‘NOI’ with ‘adverse impact on other
Members’, although the DSU does not define ‘adverse impact’. . . The text
of Article 3.8 of the DSU suggests that a Member may rebut the pre-
sumption of NOI by demonstrating that its breach of WTO rules has no
adverse impact on other Members. Trade losses represent an obvious
example of adverse impact under Article 3.8.41
This statement could be described as an obiter dictum. The successfully chal-
lenged measures had resulted in very pronounced trade losses,42 and it can
therefore be questioned whether this statement would have been made had
there been a plausible argument that the impact on trade flows was minimal
or non-existent. Nevertheless, the statement represents a clear acknowledge-
ment of how Article 3.8 should be interpreted based on its plain language, a
matter which cannot change in a predictable legal system based on the facts
of individual cases.43
How then did the panel in US – Superfund come to agree with the com-
plainants on the non-linkage between trade flows and the concept of NOI?
The panel considered that, under paragraph 5 above, the adverse impact of a
measure found to be an infringement was relevant only at the stage of the
proceedings when the suspension of concessions was being considered,
rather than at any earlier stage.44 This is indicated by the language which
41 EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, above n 3, paras 288–9.
42 Ibid para 298 in which the Appellate Body refers to undisputed evidence ‘suggesting that the
EC sugar regime caused . . . losses, for example, of US $494 million for Brazil and US $151
million for Thailand in 2002’.
43 A possible response to this position is that the Appellate Body has only provided ‘trade losses’
as ‘an obvious example of adverse impact under Article 3.8’, and that, therefore, they must
surely be other examples including, perhaps, trade opportunities. This could be correct,
although something which is an obvious example could also be the only example. Also, if
the impediment of trade opportunities is an example of something which causes adverse
impact, the Appellate Body’s statement would be disingenuous. There would be no point
in demonstrating the absence of trade losses if there is a further, and probably impossible,
requirement to demonstrate the absence of an impediment to trade opportunities. The
Appellate Body’s statement is drafted more consistently with acknowledging the possibility
of rebuttal than establishing its impossibility.
44 US – Superfund, above n 9, para 5.1.4. Having quoted part of paragraph 5 the panel com-
mented that, ‘. . .the 1979 Understanding does not refer to the adverse impact of a measure,
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appears between the underlined passages in paragraph 5. However, the fact
that trade flows are only relevant at a certain stage in the proceedings does
not change the position that paragraph 5 equates ‘adverse impact’/trade flows
with ‘NOI’. My criticism is therefore that the panel did not work through the
implications of its own vital realization. As it had correctly viewed the pre-
sumption as operating only during suspension proceedings, it was free to
reinforce this point and thereby lay to rest premature attempts by respondent
states to rebut the presumption.
This could have been achieved had the panel acknowledged the link in
paragraph 5 between adverse impact and NOI and used this link as the
departure point for its analysis. The panel would then have needed to
posit that the concept of NOI can be understood in different senses depend-
ing on the stage in the proceedings at which it is relevant. The first sentence
of paragraph 5 deals with the early stage in the proceedings during which
complaining states decide whether to have recourse to Article XXIII. They
are effectively advised only to initiate proceedings when there is NOI in the
infringement sense, or (in recognition of the non-violation complaint) when
NOI of benefits may have occurred even though there has not been an
infringement. However, the remainder of the provision deals with the stage
in the proceedings during which suspension is considered. Here, NOI is
generally understood in the sense of adverse impact on trade flows. Using
this approach, the panel could have reached a conclusion which would have
been consistent with the text. The conclusion would have been that para-
graph 5 does envisage that the presumption of NOI can be rebutted, by
adducing evidence about the limited or non-existent impact of the measure
on trade flows. A successful rebuttal would have no impact on the initial
finding of an infringement. It would merely deprive the complainant of a
remedy, or define and curtail the scope of this remedy.
Admittedly, this suggested approach to paragraph 5 would not have had
the benefit of simplicity. It calls for the same term (NOI) to be understood in
two different senses in the same provision (paragraph 5). However, the com-
plexity of this approach can be weighed against several considerations. There
is a strong argument that the panel’s approach in US – Superfund was incon-
sistent with the plain language of paragraph 5. This may have contributed to
the unabated tendency of respondent states to prematurely invoke the pre-
sumption.45 The panel’s reasoning has not been accepted, because it is not
and the possibility of a rebuttal, in connection with the power of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES to make recommendations or give rulings on measures inconsistent with the
General Agreement; it does so only in connection with the authorization of compensatory
action’. Paras 5.1.4–5.1.5.
45 This is perhaps evidenced by Turkey’s argument that, ‘WTO law requires that an alleged
breach of a Member’s right must have an economic impact on the complaining Member’ and
that the panel should therefore, ‘ignore the conclusions of the panel in US – Superfund, and of
194 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(1)
 at U
niversity of W
ales, Sw
ansea on June 14, 2012
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
entirely convincing. Paradoxically, a characteristic of the suggested approach
is that it opens the flood gates by acknowledging that there is a presumption
which is capable of being rebutted. However, both the stage in the proceed-
ings during which, and the purpose for which, this can be done, is made
expressly clear. The operation of a rebuttable presumption in the context of
determining the level of suspension is theoretically sound, albeit that the
chances of success are limited. Finally, the complexity of the suggested
approach has now been removed by DSU Article 3.8. There is only one
reference to NOI in this provision which can be understood exclusively in
the sense of adverse impact on trade flows.
A further observation is that the suggested approach is at odds with the
original rationale for the presumption. It can be recalled that this was to
simplify the process by which states can call for the establishment of a panel.
Therefore, as originally conceived, the presumption operated at the com-
mencement of proceedings, rather than during suspension proceedings.
However, paragraph 5, with its references to ‘suspension of concessions’
and ‘adverse impact’ does not itself resemble the type of the provision
which would have given expression to the original rationale. A simple state-
ment to the effect that, an allegation of an infringement constitutes an alle-
gation of NOI, would have sufficed. The task is to make sense of paragraph
5 in the form in which it was enacted, and it has been argued that an
alternative analysis to that preferred by the US – Superfund panel could
have done more to clarify this area. Faced with a provision which obstructed
rather than facilitated its conclusion, and knowing that it could not ignore or
re-write paragraph 5, the panel adopted what it probably considered to be
the only possible solution of finding that ‘the presumption had in practice
operated as an irrefutable presumption’.46 An alternative solution was how-
ever available.
IV. ELEMENTS OF THE SUGGESTED APPROACH
The discussion now turns to a search for the elements of the suggested
approach in the subsequent case law.
A. NOI can be understood in two different senses
The first element of the suggested approach is that the term NOI can be
understood in two different senses. This is the least controversial element for
which there is strong support in the case law notwithstanding an argument
by the European Communities that the term has only one meaning. An
explanation of the NOI in the infringement sense has been provided in
the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III’. WTO Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports
of Textile and Clothing Products (adopted 19November 1999), WT/DS34/R, paras 194–5.
46 US - Superfund, above n 9, para 5.1.7.
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the introduction. While some of the discussion below further illustrates this
sense, the main purpose here is to justify the view that NOI is also under-
stood as adverse impact on trade flows during proceedings to determine the
level of suspension of concessions.
Within this stage of the proceedings, DSU Article 22.4 requires that the,
‘level of the suspension of concessions . . . shall be equivalent to the level of
NOI’. Paragraph 6 foresees the possibility of disagreement on the level of
proposed suspension and paragraph 7 empowers the appointed arbitrator/s to
decide upon the issue of equivalence. Arbitrators must therefore attribute a
financial value to the ‘level of NOI’ in order to determine the permissible
level of suspension.
The arbitrators in US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25) compiled
the benefits nullified or impaired in all the previous DSU Article 22.6 arbi-
trations. They collectively read as ‘. . .losses in US exports of goods and
losses by US service suppliers in services supply; losses by Ecuador of
actual trade and of potential trade opportunities in bananas and the loss of
actual and potential distribution service supply; foregone US and Canadian
exports of hormone treated beef and beef products.’47 In the subsequent US
– Gambling (Article 22.6 – US) arbitration, the benefit nullified or impaired
was found to be the annual revenue loss for Antigua in remote services for
horseracing gambling and betting.48 In these arbitrations, the level of NOI
was equated with the impact of the challenged measures on trade flows; the
very matter which is irrelevant to whether there is NOI in the infringement
sense earlier in the proceedings.
The reference to losses by Ecuador of ‘potential trade opportunities’ above
in one of the arbitrations49 blurs the boundary between the two senses in
which NOI can be understood. However, this reference does not significantly
undermine the proposition that there are two distinct senses. In proceedings
to initially determine whether there are infringements, the finding of a vio-
lation can be based upon an entirely hypothetical potential impact on com-
petitive opportunities. The lack of any actual impact, and even the
improbability of future impact, are immaterial. This was recently confirmed
by the Appellate Body in the latest installment of the Bananas litigation:
In these proceedings, as in the original proceedings, the contested measure
may not have actual trade effects because, at present, there are no exports
47 Award of the Arbitrators, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act – Recourse to
Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU (9November 2001) WT/DS160/ARB25/1, n 39.
48 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6
of the DSU (21 December 2007), WT/DS285/ARB, paras 3.74 and 3.187.
49 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article
22.6 of the DSU (24March 2000), WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, n 52.
196 Journal of International Economic Law (JIEL) 13(1)
 at U
niversity of W
ales, Sw
ansea on June 14, 2012
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
of bananas from the United States to the European Communities.
However, in order to determine whether the United States has suffered
NOI, ‘competitive opportunities’ and, in particular, any potential export
interest of the United States must be taken into account. . . As noted by
the panel and the Appellate Body in the original proceedings, while pre-
sent production in the United States is minimal, it could at any time start
exporting the few bananas it produces to the European Communities.
That this may be unlikely does not disprove that the United States is a
potential exporter of bananas to the European Communities.50
In contrast, in suspension proceedings, to the extent that losses of potential
trade opportunities are taken into account, they probably have to be suffi-
ciently tangible to warrant the attribution of a financial sum to the losses.
The arbitrators need to be able to posit that, without the measures, the
relevant industry in the complaining state would probably have taken advan-
tage of the greater opportunity to trade. Support for this suggestion can be
derived from statements in a number of arbitrations on the need to avoid,
‘claims that are ‘‘too remote’’, ‘‘too speculative’’, or ‘‘not meaningfully
quantified’’ ’.51
Finally in this section, the argument of the EC that there, ‘. . .can be only
one notion of ‘‘NOI’’ for the purposes of the DSU’ is addressed.52 The EC
drew support for its position from the following passage in the US – 1916 Act
(EC) (Article 22.6 – US) arbitration to determine the level of suspension of
concessions:
. . .The original Panel determined that the 1916 Act ‘nullifies and impairs
benefits accruing to the European Communities.’ In light of this conclu-
sion, the level [of NOI for the purpose of suspension] must be something
greater than ‘zero’, and it is a contradiction in terms to suggest
otherwise.53
This passage does seem to support the ‘one notion’ argument for it dismisses
the possibility of the presence of NOI in the initial proceedings to determine
whether there is an infringement, without some form of NOI which would
justify the eventual suspension of concessions. However, the findings of
50 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II)), EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US)), above n
1 para 469.
51 Decision by the Arbitrators, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Original Complaint by
the European Communities – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the
DSU (24February 2004), WT/DS136/ARB, para 5.57. The arbitrators found this guidance in
earlier arbitrations.
52 WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States (adopted 22 December
2008), WT/DS27/RW/USA and Corr.1, para 4.171.
53 Above n 51, para 5.50.
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the arbitrators provide an example of the very possibility which was
dismissed.
For the purposes of suspension, it was found that, ‘the amount of any final
judgments entered against EC companies or their subsidiaries under the
1916 Act would constitute NOI of benefits accruing to the European
Communities, up to the cumulative dollar or monetary value of the final
judgments’. However, there had not been any such judgment as of the date
of the hearing so that, ‘no such amounts could be included in any calculation
of the level of NOI sustained by the European Communities’.54 Similarly,
settlement awards entered into by EC companies under the 1916 Act could
not be included in the assessment of the level of NOI, as the amounts
involved were not known because of confidentiality provisions in the agree-
ments.55 Therefore, while the EC was authorized to suspend concessions up
to the monetary value of future final judgments and future settlements if
known, the permitted level of suspension as of the date of the hearing was
zero.
It is understandable that the arbitrators placed more emphasis on the
authorization of possible suspension in the future, than on what could be
described as the suspension of the suspension remedy. There is something
counter-intuitive about confirming that values protected by the covered
agreements have been nullified or impaired, and then finding during suspen-
sion proceedings that there is no remedy available to induce the respondent
state to observe the protected values.56 For present purposes however, it
need only be noted that this is a problem which will occasionally arise
both under the approach to DSU Article 3.8 defended here, and under
WTO law and practice as it presently stands. Based on the discussion in
this section, there seems to be overwhelming evidence that the concept of
54 Ibid paras 6.4–6.5.
55 Ibid paras 6.7–6.10.
56 The occurrence of the problem is made less likely by the complexity of WTO disputes
brought about by the tendency to make multiple claims under different covered agreements.
In any given case, quantifiable trade damage caused by one or more of the offending measures
will most likely be found, to which the suspension remedy can attach, even if the same cannot
be said of all the successfully challenged measures. Thus while GATT violations were con-
firmed by the Appellate Body in the EC – Bananas III dispute, no part of the ensuing
authorization of suspension could be based on these violations as the United States was
not an exporter of bananas. However, suspension was authorized up to the amount of
US$191.4 million per year based on the GATS inconsistent aspects of the measures; specif-
ically the impact on the United States’ share of wholesale trade services sold in the European
Communities and on the United States’ share of allocated banana import licenses. The author
is grateful to Simon Lester of http://www.worldtradelaw.net for clarifying this point. Decision
by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU
(9April 1999), WT/DS27/ARB, para 7.8.
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NOI is understood in two different senses. The distinction is captured in the
following third party submission by Japan:
The WTO jurisprudence indicates that the concept of ‘NOI of a benefit’ is
not limited to trade losses of the complaining party but also include
broader interests accruing under the WTO rules. However, the ‘level of
NOI of a benefit’ in the context of the authorization of suspension of
concessions or other obligations is rather determined based on trade
effects.57
B. An infringement constitutes a case of NOI
The second element of the suggested approach is that, if an infringement of
a provision is established, there is necessarily a NOI of the benefit protected
by the provision. An infringement therefore constitutes a case of NOI, rather
than just a prima facie case. In the introduction, it was noted that, in reality,
if not always in appearance, the process of deciding whether there is NOI is
an integral part of the analysis of whether there is an infringement. This
section elaborates on the qualification in this sentence.
There is a tendency in the case law to end the analysis with a separate
discussion of NOI, sometimes using this term as a heading. Typically, this
follows on from the analysis of whether specific provisions have been
infringed. It is this structure which can lead to the misapprehension that
the closing material adds to, and is conceptually distinct from, the material
which precedes it. The reality is that, frequently, very little at all is said under
the heading of NOI. In cases where there is some discussion, it could just as
well be incorporated within the infringement analysis. The following cases
are representative of those which illustrate these points.
In cases where there has been no attempt to rebut the DSU Article 3.8
presumption, the provision has been interpreted as if it establishes an abso-
lute rule that an infringement constitutes a case of NOI. Having cited Article
3.8, the Appellate Body in US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) concluded that
to the extent that inconsistencies between the challenged Act and a number
of the covered agreements had been found, the Act ‘nullifies or impairs
benefits accruing to the appellees in this dispute under those
Agreements’.58 The panel in the later case of EC – Tariff Preferences adopted
the same approach. Again, having cited Article 3.8, the panel stated that,
‘. . ..because the Drug Arrangements are inconsistent with Article I:1 of
GATT 1994 and not justified by Article 2(a) of the Enabling Clause or
57 WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, above n 52, paras 5.231–
5.232—notes omitted.
58 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000 (adopted 27 January 2003), WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, para 304.
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Article XX(b) of GATT 1994, the European Communities has nullified or
impaired benefits accruing to India under GATT 1994’.59
In cases where there is an attempt to rebut the presumption, the redun-
dancy of the nullification concept is not so immediately obvious. This is
because there is at least some material under the heading of NOI which
did not appear in the earlier analysis of the existence of infringements.
However, the apparently additional material relates to the nature of the ben-
efits protected by the provisions in question, and merely explains why the
provisions have been infringed. Therefore, the additional material could just
as well be incorporated within the infringement analysis. The Appellate Body
recently stated as follows in the EC – Bananas III compliance hearing:
Having found that the preferential ACP tariff quota was inconsistent with
Articles I:1 and XIII, the Panel addressed the question of NOI in a sep-
arate section at the end of the US Panel Report. Relying on panel and
Appellate Body findings in the original proceedings, the Panel found that,
considering that ‘WTO rules are not concerned with actual trade effects,
but rather with competitive opportunities’, the United States, as a poten-
tial exporter of bananas, had suffered NOI because of the European
Communities’ inconsistent measures.60
Therefore, there were infringements, and there was NOI because of the
nature of the benefits protected by the infringed provisions. A description
of these benefits does not belong uniquely to a discussion of NOI. The more
natural context is within the infringement analysis.
A few words can be added here to explain how the existence of the
non-violation complaint reinforces the argument that an infringement con-
stitutes a case of NOI.61 GATT Article XXIII:1(b) envisages that the ben-
efits accruing under the Agreement can be nullified or impaired not only by
infringements, but also by ‘the application by another contracting party of
any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
Agreement’. The non-violation complaint is preserved by DSU Article
26:1 and extended to the covered agreements. The proposition that there
is always NOI whenever there is an infringement, is not undermined by the
possibility that there can also be nullification without an infringement. It is
59 WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries (adopted 20April 2004), WT/DS246/R, para 8.1(f).
60 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II)), EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US)), above
n 1, para 466.
61 On the non-violation complaint, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Violation-Complaints and
Non-Violation Complaints in Public International Trade Law’, (1991) 34 German YB Int’l
L 175; Roessler (above n 32); Thomas Cottier and Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer,
‘Non-Violation Complaints in WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and Future’,
in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed) International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Legal System,
Studies in Transnational Economic Law, volume 11 (Kluwer Law International, London
1997) 143–83.
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this possibility which explains why the concept was carried over into the
GATT from bilateral trade agreements entered into by the United States
in the 1930s and 1940s.62 As Hudec noted, the NOI clause ‘was developed
to deal with government measures, not covered by the agreement, which
frustrated the anticipated commercial benefits of tariff concessions’.63 It
would seem to follow that for government measures which are covered by
the WTO agreements, the nullification concept has no separate and addi-
tional function once a violation is confirmed.
This appears to have been the understanding of the drafters of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as evidenced by the structure and
content of Article XXIII on Dispute Settlement and Enforcement. The NOI
language is used only in paragraph 3 which deals with the non-violation
complaint. In contrast, it is absent from paragraph 1 which deals with the
violation complaint in these terms:
If any Member should consider that any other Member fails to carry out
its obligations or specific commitments under this Agreement, it may with
a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter have
recourse to the DSU.
This contrasts markedly with GATT Article XXIII, in which both the vio-
lation and non-violation complaints are brought under the umbrella of NOI.
C. Article 3.8 operates during suspension proceedings
The third element of the suggested approach is that Article 3.8 should be
interpreted as operating at the commencement of suspension proceedings,
rather than immediately after the infringement analysis. Support for this
position can first be gained from continuing the discussion at the end of
the previous section. The formal irrelevance of the NOI concept in violation
complaints under GATS Article XXIII:1 means that DSU Article 3.8 cannot
operate in GATS disputes during or immediately after the infringement
analysis. At this stage of the proceedings, there cannot be a rebuttable pre-
sumption of something which is formally irrelevant. However, DSU Article
3.8 must be regarded as applying somewhere in GATS disputes. Its opera-
tion could only be excluded if, pursuant to DSU Article 1.2, there was ‘a
difference’ between DSU Article 3.8 and ‘the special or additional rules and
procedures set forth in Appendix 2’ of the DSU. In the event of such a
difference, the special or additional rules prevail. GATS Article XXIII:1 is
not among the two GATS provisions which have the status of ‘special or
additional rules’.64 Assuming that this is deliberate, rather than an oversight,
62 On the origin of the NOI clause, see Cottier and Schefer, ibid, at 149–52.
63 Robert E Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy (2nd edn Butterworth
Legal Publishers, New Hampshire 1990) 37.
64 GATS Articles XXII:3 and XXIII:3.
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the position is that GATS Article XXIII:1 and DSU Article 3.8 need to be
interpreted so that they can co-exist harmoniously. This is achieved if Article
3.8 is interpreted as a presumption of NOI in the sense of adverse impact on
trade flows which operates at the commencement of suspension proceedings.
More generally, this suggestion flows naturally from the hypotheses which
have been explained and tested above. There is strong evidence that the term
NOI is understood in two different senses. In cases where an infringement
has been established, there is no evidence of there being a residual and
conceptually distinct matter to be discussed under the heading of NOI.
It follows that a rebuttable presumption of NOI operating when the issue
of infringement is discussed, is unsustainable. In contrast, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of NOI in the sense of adverse impact operating at the commence-
ment of suspension proceedings is sustainable. Infringements frequently have
an actual impact on trade flows even though it may be possible for the
respondent state to show the absence of such impact. This presumption is
also consistent with the language of 3.8. It refers to a presumption of NOI in
the sense of ‘adverse impact’, rather than a presumption of NOI of benefits
accruing to the members under the covered agreements. Bearing in mind
that this third element provides a means of making sense of DSU Article 3.8
as it is presently drafted, it is surprising to find little evidence of it in the case
law. The prevailing view is rather that the presumption operates after the
infringement analysis.
This view is illustrated by the following panel statement which was
approved by the Appellate Body in the EC – Bananas III compliance hearing.
[t]he presumption of NOI in the case of an infringement of a GATT pro-
vision as set forth by Article 3.8 of the DSU cannot in and of itself be
taken simultaneously as evidence proving a particular level of NOI allegedly
suffered by a Member requesting authorization to suspend concessions
under Article 22 of the DSU at a much later stage of the WTO dispute
settlement system.65
This passage clearly establishes that Article 3.8 operates before Article 22.
To this extent, the passage contradicts the suggested approach. Significantly
however, there is nothing here to undermine the view that Article 3.8 should
be interpreted as operating at the start of suspension proceedings. To the
contrary, the suggested approach is consistent with the main sentiment of
this passage. The presumption would only provide the starting point that the
infringement has resulted in an adverse impact on trade flows. The level of
this adverse impact would remain to be decided.
65 EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II)), EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US)), above
n 1, para 475. The extract is from Decision by the Arbitrators, above n 65, para 6.10.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
For the reasons explained in this article, DSU 3.8 should be interpreted
as a rebuttable presumption operating at the commencement of suspen-
sion proceedings that an infringement results in an adverse impact on
trade flows.
The final question considered here is whether it is reasonable to expect
the dispute settlement system to adopt this interpretation, or whether
amendments to the DSU should be contemplated. Based on the analysis
above of the three elements of the suggested approach, it is perhaps not
unreasonable to leave matters to the Appellate Body. There is strong evi-
dence of the first two elements in the case law so that it could be just a
matter of time before the final piece of the puzzle is slotted into place. This
would not amount to an exercise in judicial activism as it amounts to no
more than a sensible re-interpretation of the provision, rather than its
amendment or deletion.
On balance, however, it is considered that it would be beneficial to add
Article 3.8 to the DSU reform negotiations.66 This is because there are two
distinct matters which need to be addressed. There is first a need to give
effect to the original rationale identified by the GATT panel in Uruguayan
Recourse to Article XXIII. This was to simplify the process by which com-
plaining states can permissibly call for the establishment of a panel. As sug-
gested above, paragraph 5 of the 1979 text, with its references to ‘suspension
of concessions’ and ‘adverse impact’ does not resemble the type of the pro-
vision which would have given expression to this rationale. DSU Article 3.8
could therefore be replaced with a more straightforward statement that an
allegation of an infringement constitutes an allegation of NOI. The second
matter is for the correct interpretation of Article 3.8, as it is presently
drafted, to be put beyond doubt. This could be achieved by inserting an
additional provision in DSU Article 22 which would fit well as paragraph 3.
The text might then read:
In proceedings to determine the level of compensation or the suspension
of concessions, there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules
has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agree-
ment, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the
complaint has been brought to rebut the charge.
66 Information about the progress of these on-going negotiations and the proposed changes to
the DSU is available on the WTO’s web pages: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_e.htm#negotiations> accessed 10 August 2009. The proposals made are compiled on
the Georgetown Law pages: <http://www.law.georgetown.edu/iiel/research/projects/dsureview/
synopsis.html#art3> accessed 10 August 2009. The indications are that Article 3.8 has so far
escaped the attention of the negotiators.
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So self-evident is the meaning of this provision that it could perhaps be
omitted. However, in combination, the proposed changes would send clear
signals about what arguments can permissibly be raised at different stages in
the proceedings, and lead to a modest simplification of the dispute settle-
ment process.
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